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United States District Court 
Central District of California 
 
HOMEAWAY.COM, INC. 
   Plaintiff, 
 v. 
CITY OF SANTA MONICA, 
   Defendant. 
Case Nos. 2:16-cv-06641-ODW (AFM) 
2:16-cv-06645-ODW (AFM) 
 
AIRBNB, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CITY OF SANTA MONICA, 
Defendant. 
 
ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 
DISMISS [75] 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs Airbnb, Inc. and Homeaway.com, Inc. (collectively “Plaintiffs”) 
challenge the City of Santa Monica’s (the “City”) Ordinance Number 2535 prohibiting 
short-term housing rentals (the “Ordinance”).  The City moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 
federal-law claims and requests that the Court decline supplemental jurisdiction over 
the remaining state-law claim.  For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the 
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City’s Motion.1  (Mot., ECF No. 75.)   
II. BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs operate websites that allow individuals seeking, and persons listing, 
accommodations (“guests” and “hosts,” respectively) to find each other and enter into 
agreements to reserve and book accommodations.  (Airbnb First Am. Compl. (“ABB 
FAC”) ¶¶ 27–28, Case No. 2:16-cv-6645 ECF No. 49; HomeAway First Am. Compl. 
(“HA FAC”) ¶¶ 18–20, Case No. 2:16-cv-6641 ECF No. 55.)2  Hosts provide the 
content of their listings, such as description, price, and availability, (ABB FAC ¶¶ 31–
32; HA FAC ¶ 19) and “are responsible for their Listings,” (ABB FAC ¶ 9; see HA 
FAC ¶ 23).  Plaintiffs do not generally review listings before they are posted, so 
listings appear on their websites almost immediately after hosts post them.  (ABB 
FAC ¶ 32; HA FAC ¶ 19.) 
Airbnb and HomeAway operate with different business models.  Airbnb 
provides payment processing services that permit hosts to receive payments 
electronically.  (ABB FAC ¶ 28.)  Airbnb receives a fee from the guest and host, 
which covers its listing services, calculated as a percentage of the booking fee.  (Id. 
¶ 29.)  HomeAway hosts pay for services in one of two ways: a pay-per-booking 
option based on a percentage of the amount charged by the host, or buying a 
subscription to advertise properties for a set period.  (HA FAC ¶ 21.)  Travelers using 
HomeAway pay hosts directly or through third-party payment processors.  (Id. ¶ 20.) 
In May 2015, the City adopted Ordinance 2484CCS (the “Original Ordinance”), 
adding Chapter 6.20 to the Municipal Code.  (ABB FAC ¶ 43; HA FAC ¶ 24.)  The 
Original Ordinance prohibited “Vacation Rentals,” which were defined as rentals of 
residential property for thirty consecutive days or less, where residents do not remain 
within their units to host guests.  Santa Monica Municipal Code (“SMMC”) 
                                                          
1 After carefully considering the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the Motion, the Court 
deems the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15. 
2 Unless specifically noted otherwise, citations to the docket are from the lead case No. 2:16-cv-
6641. 
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§§ 6.20.010(a), 6.20.020(a).  The Original Ordinance permitted residents to host 
visitors for compensation for a period of less than thirty-one days, so long as residents 
obtained a business license and remained on-site throughout the visitor’s stay.  SMMC 
§ 6.20.010(a).  The City claims that the Original Ordinance expressly adopted and 
reaffirmed the City’s longstanding prohibition on short-term rentals.3  (Mot. 4.)  
Plaintiffs argue that that the Original Ordinance marked a change in the law, because 
before it was passed, the City never directly banned short-term rentals.  (See Opp’n 3, 
ECF No. 80.)   
The Original Ordinance also regulated “Hosting Platforms” like Plaintiffs, by 
barring them from “advertis[ing]” or “facilitat[ing]” rentals that violated the City’s 
short-term rental laws.  SMMC § 6.20.030.  It also required them to (1) collect and 
remit to the City applicable Transient Occupancy Tax revenue and (2) disclose certain 
information about listings to the City, including the names of the persons responsible 
for each listing, the address, the length of stay, and the price paid for each stay.  
SMMC §§ 6.20.030, 6.20.050.  The City issued Plaintiffs several citations pursuant to 
the Original Ordinance, which Plaintiffs paid under protest.  (ABB FAC ¶ 50; HA 
FAC ¶ 27.) 
When the City increased its enforcement efforts, Plaintiffs filed the instant case 
on September 2, 2016.  (See Compl., ECF No. 1.)  On September 21, 2016, the parties 
stipulated to stay the case to allow the City to prepare and consider amendments to the 
Original Ordinance to address the legal challenges Plaintiffs raised.  (ECF No. 20.) 
On January 24, 2017, the City adopted the Ordinance, which amended the 
Original Ordinance.  The Ordinance does not prohibit the publication, or require the 
removal of, content provided to Plaintiffs by hosts, nor does it require Plaintiffs to 
verify content provided by hosts to ensure that short-term rental hosts comply with the 
                                                          
3 According to the City, the City’s Zoning Ordinance identifies the uses that are specifically 
permitted in each district.  (Mot. 4.)  Under this permissive zoning scheme, if a use is not listed, it is 
prohibited.  (Id.)  The City claims that the legislative record shows that vacation rentals have not 
been a permitted use in any residential zoning district since at least 1988.  (Id.) 
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law.  See SMMC § 6.20.050(c).  Rather, the Ordinance prohibits Hosting Platforms 
from “complet[ing] any booking transaction for any residential property or unit unless 
it is listed on the City’s registry [of licensed home-sharing hosts] at the time the 
hosting platform receives a fee for the booking transaction.”  Id.  A “booking 
transaction” is “[a]ny reservation or payment service provided by a person who 
facilitates a home-sharing or vacation rental transaction between a prospective 
transient user and a host.”  Id. § 6.20.010(d).  Further, the Ordinance permits the City 
to “issue and serve administrative subpoenas as necessary to obtain specific 
information regarding home-sharing and vacation rental listings located in the City, 
including but not limited to” the information in Section 6.20.050(b).  Id. 
§ 6.20.100(e).  Each violation of the Ordinance is an infraction, punishable by a fine 
of up to $250, or a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine up to $500, imprisonment of up 
to six months, or both.  Id. § 6.20.100(a).  The Ordinance provides that the duties 
imposed on hosting platforms “will not apply if determined by the City to be in 
violation of, or preempted by” state or federal laws.  Id. § 6.20.050(f).   
On December 13, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint, alleging 
that the Ordinance violates the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230, the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, the 
Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C.§ 2701 et seq., and the California Coastal Act, 
Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 30500 et seq.  The City moved to dismiss on February 15, 
2018. 
III. LEGAL STANDARD 
A complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 
(2009).  The determination whether a complaint satisfies the plausibility standard is a 
“context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 
experience and common sense.”  Id. at 679.  A court is generally limited to the 
pleadings and must construe all “factual allegations set forth in the complaint . . . as 
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true and . . . in the light most favorable” to the plaintiff.  Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 
250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001).  But a court need not blindly accept conclusory 
allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact, and unreasonable inferences.  Sprewell v. 
Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).  The court must dismiss a 
complaint that does not assert a cognizable legal theory or fails to plead sufficient 
facts to support an otherwise cognizable legal theory.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); 
Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 
IV. REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
The Court first addresses the City’s pending requests for judicial notice.  (Req. 
Judicial Notice, ECF No. 76.)  While a district court generally may not consider any 
material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may 
consider any documents referenced in the complaint, and may take judicial notice of 
matters in the public record, without converting a motion to dismiss into one for 
summary judgment.  See Lee, 250 F.3d at 688–89.  However, the Court can only take 
judicial notice of the existence of these documents, not the truth of the matters 
contained therein.  See id. at 690 (explaining that when taking the judicial notice of 
public documents, the district court should do so “not for the truth of the facts recited 
therein,” but for the existence of the document). 
The City requests the Court to take judicial notice of the following: 
Exhibit Q:  The Ellis Act and its Effects on Rent-Stabilized 
Housing in Santa Monica, a Study of Factors Leading to 
Withdrawal and Possible Mitigation Strategies, Presented to the 
Santa Monica Rent Control Board as Item 12a at the November 
9, 2017 Regular Meeting of the Santa Monica Rent Control 
Board; 
Exhibit R:  Information Item – Short-Term Rental Program 
Update, from David Martin, Director of Planning and 
Community Development for the Mayor and City Council, 
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prepared by the Office of the City Manager, dated February 9, 
2018; 
Exhibit S:  California’s Housing Future: Challenges and 
Opportunities, Public Draft – Statewide Housing Assessment 
2025, prepared by the State of California, California Business, 
Consumer Services and Housing Agency, California 
Department of Housing and Community Development. 
The City claims that these exhibits are public documents, maintained as part of 
the City’s files regarding short-term rentals and their effect on the City’s housing.  
(Req. Judicial Notice 3.)  Plaintiffs do not oppose the City’s Requests.  Therefore, the 
Court takes judicial notice of Exhibits Q–S as to their existence in the City’s files 
regarding short-term rentals, but not for the truth of the matters asserted therein. 
V. ANALYSIS 
The City argues that Plaintiffs cannot prevail on their federal claims and the 
Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.  The 
Court addresses each claim in turn. 
A. Communications Decency Act 
Plaintiffs allege that the Ordinance violates the CDA, 47 U.S.C. § 230, because 
the Ordinance treats Plaintiffs as the publisher or speaker of information provided by 
the hosts, who are third-party content providers.  (HA FAC ¶ 41; ABB FAC ¶ 93.)   
Under the CDA, “no provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  Plaintiffs argue that, by requiring them to 
verify whether a listing is included on the City’s registry before completing a booking 
transaction, the Ordinance imposes liability on them based on content supplied by 
third parties.  (Opp’n 14–15.)  The City argues that Plaintiffs’ CDA claims must be 
dismissed because the Ordinance targets unlawful conduct that is unrelated to 
publishing activities.  (Mot. 11.) 
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The parties fully addressed these arguments previously in response to Plaintiffs’ 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction.  In the Court’s Order denying the preliminary 
injunction, the Court agreed with the City, finding that the Ordinance does not 
penalize Plaintiffs’ publishing activities; rather, it seeks to keep them from facilitating 
business transactions on their sites that violate the law.  (ECF No. 81.)  In reaching 
this decision, the Court followed a decision in a similar case from the Northern 
District of California in Airbnb, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 217 F. 
Supp. 3d 1066, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (the “San Francisco Decision”). 
The Court finds no reason to alter its previous reasoning on Plaintiffs’ CDA 
claim.  As a new argument, however, Plaintiffs point out the different standard of 
proof for establishing entitlement to a preliminary injunction as compared to opposing 
a motion to dismiss.  They argue that for the purposes of the Motion to Dismiss the 
Court must accept as true their allegations that the Ordinance will require them to 
“monitor and screen listings prior to publication” to “avoid the risk of significant 
criminal and civil penalties.”  (Opp’n 15 (citing ABB FAC ¶¶ 75, 95 and HA FAC 
¶¶ 9, 37).)  According to Plaintiffs, monitoring and screening are “core publisher 
functions, which Section 230 immunizes from regulation.”  (Opp’n 15.)  Plaintiffs ask 
the Court to ignore the San Francisco Decision and instead rely on Doe v. Internet 
Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2016), Barnes v. Yahoo! Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th 
Cir. 2009), and Green v. Am. Online, 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003).   
The cases Plaintiffs urges the Court to follow, however, were not answering the 
same question as the one presented here and are distinguishable.  In Internet Brands, a 
Jane Doe plaintiff brought a claim for negligent failure to warn against the operator 
and owner of a networking website.  In adjudicating the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss, the court found that the plaintiff’s claim was not barred by the CDA because 
it was unrelated to the defendant’s publishing activities; rather, she claimed that the 
defendant should have warned her about information it obtained from an outside 
source about “how third parties targeted and lured victims through” the website.  
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Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 851.  The Internet Brands court found that the plaintiff’s 
negligent-failure-to-warn claim survived because it did “not seek to hold [the 
defendant] liable as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.”  Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).  While the 
court noted that the plaintiff’s claim “has nothing to do with [the defendant’s] efforts, 
or lack thereof, to edit, monitor, or remove user generated content,” it did not hold that 
“monitoring” alone, without further editing or decision-making regarding posting or 
removal of content, was a protected publishing activity.  See id. at 852.   
In Barnes, the issue presented was whether the CDA protects an internet service 
provider from suit where it undertook to remove from its website material harmful to 
the plaintiff but failed to do so.  570 F.3d at 1098.  The plaintiff’s ex-boyfriend created 
fake profiles for her, which contained nude photographs, on a website run by the 
defendant.  The plaintiff demanded the defendant take down the fake profiles. The 
defendant told her that they would take steps to remove the content, but they never 
did.  The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s negligent-
provision-of-services claim, but allowed her promissory estoppel claim to proceed.  
The difference, the court explained, was the first claim sought liability based on “the 
defendant’s status or conduct as a publisher or speaker” and the latter claim, based on 
quasi-contract principles, did not.  See id. at 1107.   
The Barnes court’s description of what constitutes a publisher is helpful.  The 
court provided that “publication involves reviewing, editing, and deciding whether to 
publish or to withdraw from publication third-party content.”  Id. at 1101.  For this 
proposition, the court cited Fair Housing Council of San Francisco Valley v. 
Roommates.com, LLC, which held that “any activity that can be boiled down to 
deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post online is perforce 
immune under section 230.”  Id. at 1102 (citing 521 F.3d 1157, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 
2008)).  The Barnes court ultimately concluded that “a publisher reviews material 
submitted for publication, perhaps edits it for style or technical fluency, and then 
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decides whether to publish it.”  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102.  Here, Plaintiffs are not 
being punished for their editorial decisions, such as which listings are published or 
how properties are advertised.  The Ordinance only prohibits the illegal transactions. 
In Green, the plaintiff sought damages against America Online (“AOL”) for 
refusing to take action against John Does 1 and 2, who allegedly transmitted harmful 
online messages to the plaintiff and others.  318 F.3d 464, 468 (3d Cir. 2003).  The 
Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the claims, because the liability 
the plaintiff sought to impose would treat AOL as the publisher or speaker of the 
harmful content.  Id. at 470.  The court found that section 230 “bars lawsuits seeking 
to hold a service provide liable for its exercise of traditional editorial functions – such 
as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter content.”  Id. at 471 
(quoting Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997)).  Similar to the 
situation in Barnes, the Green plaintiff sought damages for the defendant’s failure to 
remove harmful content.  This is a different scenario then the one at issue here, where 
the Ordinance does not require Plaintiffs to remove any particular listing or content. 
Plaintiffs argue the Ordinance requires them to “monitor and screen” listings, 
which they argue are “publishing” activities, and thus, the Ordinance runs afoul of the 
CDA.  Ultimately, the Court disagrees that the conduct regulated by the Ordinance is a 
publishing activity and finds that neither Barnes, Internet Brands, nor Green dictate a 
different result.  The Ordinance prevents Plaintiffs from facilitating booking 
transactions for illegal rentals.  It does not require Plaintiffs to edit or exclude any 
content on their websites.  In the San Francisco Decision, the court distinguished 
between a hypothetical unlawful regulation that “regulate[s] what can or cannot be 
said or posted in the listings” and a permissible regulation that “held plaintiffs liable 
for their own conduct, namely for providing, and collecting a fee for, Booking 
Services in connection with an unregistered unit.”  217 F. Supp. 3d at 1073.  The 
Court agrees with this reasoning and finds that the Ordinance does not impose liability 
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on Plaintiffs’ for publishing activities.  Therefore, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ 
CDA claim—Airbnb’s Claim No. 3 and HomeAway’s Claim No. 1—with prejudice. 
B. First Amendment 
Plaintiffs allege that the Ordinance is a content-based restriction that burdens 
and impermissibly chills their protected commercial speech and, therefore, violates the 
First Amendment.  (ABB FAC ¶ 103; HA ¶ 45.)  Plaintiffs incorporate their arguments 
in support of their Motion for Preliminary Injunction in their Opposition.  (Opp’n 18.)  
In the Order denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, the Court found 
that the Ordinance regulates conduct, not speech, and that the conduct banned by the 
Ordinance—booking transactions for residential properties not listed on the City’s 
registry—does not have such a “significant expressive element” as to draw First 
Amendment protection.  The Court sees no reason to revisit the reasoning set out in its 
previous order, which addressed the arguments presented in relation to the Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction.  Instead, the Court addresses only the new arguments 
Plaintiffs raise in their Opposition to the City’s Motion to Dismiss. 
Plaintiffs focus on three additional cases cited by the City:  Central Hudson Gas 
& Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 564 
(1980); United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297–98 (2008); and Valle Del Sol Inc. 
v. Whiting, 709 F.3d 808, 822 (9th Cir. 2013).  (Opp’n 18–20.)   
The City cites Central Hudson for the proposition that even if the Ordinance 
were construed to restrict commercial speech, it would survive the intermediate 
scrutiny called for in that case.  (Mot. 16.)  Plaintiffs argue that Central Hudson 
confirms that the First Amendment protects commercial speech.   (Opp’n 19.)  In 
Central Hudson, the Supreme Court applied intermediate scrutiny to overturn a 
regulation from the Public Service Commission of the State of New York that banned 
utility companies from advertising electricity services.  447 U.S. at 558–59.  However, 
the Court need not decide whether the Ordinance survives intermediate scrutiny, 
because the Court concludes that the Ordinance does not regulate speech.  The 
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Ordinance imposes no liability on Plaintiffs for the content of materials on their 
websites.  The Ordinance is quite different from the regulation at issue in Central 
Hudson, which was a direct ban on a particular form of speech. 
The City cites Williams and Valle Del Sol for its contention that the First 
Amendment does not protect offers to engage in unlawful conduct.  (Mot. 16.)  
Plaintiffs reply that where, as here, a listing is not unlawful “on its face,” First 
Amendment protection applies.  (Opp’n 19 (citing Braun v. Soldier of Fortune 
Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110, 1117–19 (11th Cir. 1992)).)  The Court agrees with the 
City that the First Amendment does not protect speech proposing an illegal 
transaction.  See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human 
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388–89 (1973) (“Any First Amendment interest which might 
be served by advertising an ordinary commercial proposal and which might arguably 
outweigh the governmental interest supporting the regulation is altogether absent 
when the commercial activity itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising is 
incidental to a valid limitation on economic activity.”).  There can be no dispute that it 
is illegal in Santa Monica to rent a unit that does not comply with the Ordinance.  
Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot use the First Amendment as a shield to allow them to 
communicate offers to rent illegal units.  See Airbnb, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1079.   
Braun does not require a different result.  The City points out that the Braun 
court did not hold that the First Amendment protected advertisement of illegal conduct 
unless the illegality appeared “on its face.”  (Reply 10, ECF No. 82.)  The Court 
agrees.  In Braun, the court simply found that under the Georgia negligence standard it 
may be appropriate to impose tort liability on a publisher when an advertisement “on 
its face” clearly made it apparent that there was a substantial risk of harm to the 
public.  968 F.2d at 1118.  The court also recognized that “[i]t is well-settled that the 
First Amendment does not protect commercial speech ‘related to illegal activity’ and, 
thus, there is no constitutional interest in publishing . . . ads that solicit criminal 
activity.”  Id. at 1117 (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564, and Pittsburgh Press, 
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413 U.S. at 388). 
For these reasons, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ First Amendment Claim—
Airbnb’s Claim No. 4 and HomeAway’s Claim No. 2—with prejudice. 
C. Fourteenth Amendment 
Plaintiffs allege that the Ordinance violates the Fourteenth Amendment because 
it imposes strict criminal liability without proof of mens rea or scienter.  (ABB FAC 
¶ 108, HA FAC ¶ 46.)  The City now claims that it “will accept the imputation of a 
requirement for scienter” and “nothing in the . . . Ordinance’s legislative record 
suggests that the City Council intended to dispense with mens rea as an element.”  
(Mot. 17.)  The City also argues that the absence of a specified mens rea does not 
invalidate a criminal statute; instead, scienter is an implied element for proving 
criminal liability.  (Id. (citing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605–06 (1994)).)  
The Court agrees.  In Staples, the Supreme Court explained that a mens rea element 
can be implied and that in interpreting federal statutes, “some indication of 
congressional intent, express or implied, is required to dispense with mens rea as an 
element of a crime.”  511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994).  California courts have taken a similar 
approach and have read scienter into statutes with civil penalties.  See, e.g., People v. 
Simon, 9 Cal. 4th 493, 522 (1995); Stark v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 4th 368, 393 
(2011) (“In recent jurisprudence, we have construed criminal statutes to include a 
guilty knowledge requirement even though the statutes did not expressly articulate 
such a requirement”); People v. Salas, 37 Cal. 4th 967, 978 (2006).  Therefore, the 
Court construes the Ordinance as requiring scienter.  See Airbnb, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 
1080.  The Court DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Claim—Airbnb’s 
Claim No. 5 and HomeAway’s Claim No. 2—with prejudice. 
D. Stored Communications Act and Fourth Amendment 
Plaintiffs allege that the Ordinance’s requirement that they regularly disclose 
private user information to the City, without any subpoena or other form of legal 
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process, violates the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) and the Fourth 
Amendment.  (HA FAC ¶¶ 47–52; ABB FAC ¶¶ 111–22.)   
The Ordinance provides that, “[s]ubject to applicable laws, hosting platforms 
shall disclose to the City on a regular basis each home-sharing and vacation rental 
located in the City, the names of the persons responsible for each such listing, the 
address of each such listing, the length of stay for each such listing and the price paid 
for each stay.”  SMMC § 6.20.050(b).  The City argues that the “applicable laws” 
provision means that the Ordinance must comply with the SCA, the Fourth 
Amendment, and SMMC § 6.20.100(e), which outlines an administrative subpoena 
process for the City to obtain the information described above.  Section 6.20.100(e) 
provides: 
The City may issue and serve administrative subpoenas as 
necessary to obtain specific information regarding home-
sharing and vacation rental listings located in the City, 
including, but not limited to, the names of the persons 
responsible for each such listing, the address of each such 
listing, the length of stay for each such listing and the price paid 
for each stay, to determine whether the home-sharing and 
vacation rental listings comply with this Chapter.  Any 
subpoena issued pursuant to this section shall not require the 
production of information sooner than thirty days from the date 
of service.  A person that has been served with an 
administrative subpoena may seek judicial review during that 
thirty-day period. 
 The City also points to § 6.20.050(f), which requires that “[t]he provisions of 
this Section shall be interpreted in accordance with otherwise applicable State and 
Federal law(s) . . .”   
 The SCA “protects users whose electronic communications are in electronic 
storage with an [internet service provider] or other electronic communications 
facility.”  Theofel v. Farley-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1072–73 (9th Cir. 2004).  The SCA 
allows for a governmental entity to require an internet service provider to disclose 
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contents of the communications protected by the Act, if the governmental entity 
obtains a warrant, an administrative subpoena, or a court order.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(b).   
Additionally, the Fourth Amendment requires that the subject of an 
administrative search must be afforded an opportunity to obtain pre-compliance 
review before a neutral decision-maker.  City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 
2452 (2015).  Plaintiffs assert a facial and an as-applied challenge to the Ordinance.  
A facial challenge is an attack on a statute or regulation itself as opposed to a 
particular application.  Id. at 2449.  In analyzing such a challenge, the Court analyzes 
the statute or regulation at issue and considers whether applications of that law, 
permitted on its face, violate the Constitution.  See id. at 2451.   
 Plaintiffs primarily rely on Patel to support their Fourth Amendment claim.  In 
that case, the Supreme Court found that a Los Angeles regulation requiring hotel 
owners to divulge registration information to police officers on demand to be facially 
invalid under the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 2453.  The court noted that the City of 
Los Angeles did “not even attempt to argue that [the regulation] affords hotel 
operators any opportunity [for pre-compliance review] whatsoever.”  Id.  Here, on the 
contrary, the City argues that the Ordinance expressly permits Hosting Platforms a 
period of time to review the administrative subpoena requesting the information and 
seek judicial review under § 6.20.100(e).  (Mot. 23.)  Plaintiffs respond that they are 
not challenging § 6.20.100(e), but § 6.20.050(b), which does not mention 
administrative subpoenas or judicial review.  The latter section, however, includes a 
qualifier that it is “subject to applicable laws,” which the Court interprets to include 
the subpoena and review provisions in § 6.20.100(e), the SCA, and the Fourth 
Amendment.  Therefore, the Court finds that the Ordinance does not violate the SCA 
or the Fourth Amendment on its face. 
 The Court also finds that Plaintiffs have not adequately pleaded an as-applied 
challenge to the Ordinance.  Plaintiffs make no allegation that the City has attempted 
to enforce § 6.20.050(b) at all, with or without the use of an administrative subpoena.  
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Therefore, Plaintiffs have not alleged that the disclosure provision in the Ordinance 
has been applied to them.  See Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 635 (9th Cir. 
1998) (“An as-applied challenge contends that the law is unconstitutional as applied to 
the [plaintiff’s] particular . . . activity, even though the law may be capable of valid 
application to others.”).  The Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for 
violation of the SCA and/or the Fourth Amendment—Airbnb’s Claims Nos. 6 and 7 
and HomeAway’s Claims Nos. 3 and 4—and DISMISSES those claims with 
prejudice.   
E. California Coastal Act 
Because the Court has dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ pending federal claims, the 
Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law 
claims under the California Coastal Act.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also United 
Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“Needless decisions of state 
law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the 
parties, by procuring them for a surer-footed reading of applicable law.  Certainly, if 
the federal law claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a 
jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well.”)  Therefore, the 
Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ California Coastal Act Claims—Airbnb’s Claims Nos. 1 
and 2 and HomeAway’s Claims No. 5—without prejudice. 
F. Declaratory Relief 
As discussed above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim 
for their federal causes of action and declines to exercise jurisdiction over their state-
law claims.  Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot sustain an action for declaratory relief. 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the City’s Motion to Dismiss.  
(ECF No. 75.)  The Court DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ California Coastal Act Claim 
WITHOUT PREJUDICE and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE all other claims.  
The Clerk of the Court shall close the case. 
 
 IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
June 14, 2018 
        ____________________________________ 
                 OTIS D. WRIGHT, II 
            UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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